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International
Migration Review 
Largely as a result of high rates of immigration from the Asian Pacific
Triangle countries ushered in by these reforms, the nonwhite ethnic minori?
ty population (i.e., Asians, Hispanics, and blacks) grew more than seven times as fast as the non-Hispanic white majority population during the 1980s (Frey, 1993) . The Asian population doubled from 3.5 million to over 7 million.
The Hispanic population increased by more than half-from 14.6 million to 22.3 million. And blacks added 3.5 million to their population, reaching a total count of almost 30 million in 1990. As a result of these increases, the nonwhite ethnic minority population is now comprised of 60.5 million peo? ple -almost a quarter (24.4%) of the total U.S. population (Frey, 1993 
International Migration Review
Based on the demographic changes taking place during the 1980s, and assuming continued high levels of immigration, the U.S. population is now projected to grow much more rapidly and to become far more diverse in the future than was anticipated by the U.S. Census Bureau as recently as seven years ago. In 1988, the Census Bureau estimated that the U.S. population would continue to grow until 2010, when it would peak at around 300 mil? lion, and then remain relatively stable until 2050. But more recent projec? tions indicate that U.S. population growth is not likely to peak in 2010; instead, the nation's population is projected to increase by 50 percent over the next 60 years, reaching 375 million in 2050.
The revised projections are based on the Census Bureau's realization that the U.S. population will not approach zero population growth (ZPG) in the foreseeable future, as assumed in its 1988 projections. Those projections were based, generally, on the assumption that the population growth rates of nonwhite ethnic minority groups would approximate the non-Hispanic white rate by the end of this decade, which currently approaches ZPG (that is, the average white family has about 1.7 children and thus is relatively stable). But more recent analyses based on the 1990 census and the annual Current Population Survey suggest that this was an unrealistic assumption. Between now and the year 2050, the black population is projected to increase by 94 percent, the American Indian population by 109 percent, the Hispanic population by 238 percent, and the Asian and Pacific Islander pop? ulation by 412 percent. By contrast, the non-Hispanic white population is projected to increase by only 29.4 percent over the next 60 years. What this means, of course, is that, largely as a consequence of continued high rates of immigration -legal and illegal -and high rates of natural increase among recently arrived immigrants, nonwhite ethnic minority groups will continue to be responsible for the majority of the nation's population growth over the next six decades (Holmes, 1995; Martin, 1995a Martin, , 1995b .
THE NATIVIST BACKLASH
How has the U.S. citizenry responded to the aforementioned demographic changes and population projections? Public opinion polls and other data indicate that there is a steadily increasing fear of the so-called "browning of America," a growing intolerance among native Americans {i.e., those who were born in the United States of parents who were also born in America) of immigrants, and growing opposition to what is perceived to be the nation's open door immigration policy on the one hand and its seeming inability to stem the tide of illegal immigration on the other (Brimelow, 1995) .
Perceptions of Impacts
At the most general level, U.S. citizens harbor negative views and beliefs about the impact of recent immigration on American society. In a recent Newsweek poll, nearly half of those surveyed indicate that "immigrants are a burden on our country because they take jobs, housing and [consume] health care" (Adler and Waldman, 1995:18) . Only 40 percent think that "immigrants strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents."
In another Newsweek poll, two-thirds of the non-Hispanic whites (66%) and nearly half of the blacks (46%) surveyed say that the level of immigration to the United States should be decreased (Brownstein, 1995) . In California, one of the states that has borne the brunt of immigration, in a 1988 statewide poll, three-fourths of the whites (75%) and two-thirds of the blacks (66.9%) surveyed said they were worried about the changing make-up of California's population. Underlying their concerns was the belief that the immi? gration of people of Asian and Hispanic background "will make it hard to main? tain American traditions and the American way of life" (Field Institute, 1988). A majority of both the whites and the blacks surveyed indicated that they thought that the place of English as our common language was being endan? gered and that the quality of education was being lowered by recent immigra? tion, especially the influx of Hispanics (Field Institute, 1988) .
In a more recent survey of a multiethnic sample of Los Angeles households (see Johnson, Oliver and Bobo, 1994) , several questions were included to gauge the perceived political and economic impacts of continued high rates of immi? gration on American society. As Table 1 shows, the black and non-Hispanic white respondents are far more likely than the Hispanic, Korean, Japanese and Chinese respondents to perceive that continued immigration is likely to have a negative impact on their well-being. Roughly one-half of both the non-Hispanic white and the black survey respondents express the belief that they would either have less or a lot less political influence and economic opportunity than they currently have if immigration is allowed to continue at the present rate. a Reported percentage corresponds to the proportion of survey respondents who expressed the belief that they would either have "less" or "a lot less" political influence and economic opportunity than they currently have if immigration is allowed to continue at the present rate. b If immigration to this country continues at the present rate, how much political influence do you believe people like you (R's group -white, black, Asian, Hispanic people) will have? 1) much political influence, 2) some, but not a lot more, 3) no more or less than now, 4) a lot less than now. c If immigration to this country continues at the present rate, do you believe people like you (Rs group) will probably have 1) much more economic opportunity, 2) some, but not a lot more, 3) no more or less than now, 4) less than now, 5) a lot less opportunity than now? Migration Review It is noteworthy that these perceptions are radically different from those of Hispanic, Chinese, Korean and Japanese survey respondents. No more than one-third of the respondents in any one of these groups share this view. Given that the latter groups are comprised of a high percentage of recently arrived immigrants, the difference in their perceptions and those of native-born blacks and non-Hispanic whites regarding the impact of continued high rates of immigration is not surprising.
Further insights into the nature of the concerns about immigration are evi? dent in Tables 2 and 3 , which also were derived from the recent Los Angeles survey. In addition to the rift that our immigration policy has created between the foreign born and the native born, it also has prompted consider? able antagonisms among nonwhite ethnic minority groups. A majority of the blacks surveyed believe that the more influence Asians and Hispanics have in local politics the less influence they will have in local politics. As Table 2 shows, one-half of the Hispanics surveyed express similar concerns about Asians. A majority of the blacks surveyed also agree with the statement that more good jobs for both Asians and Hispanics would mean fewer good jobs for blacks (Table 3) . In contrast, Hispanics only view themselves as being in direct competition with Asians for good jobs. (Bobo etal, 1995a ). In the survey, respondents were asked to rank, on a seven point scale, members of their own ethnic group and members of each of the other major ethnic categories. The end points of the scales were defined in terms of three key pairs of traits: intelligent to unintelligent, prefer to live off welfare to pre? fer to be self-supporting, and hard to get along with to easy to get along with.
Thus, these data provide insights into the extent to which members of any given group (e.g., whites) rate members of other groups (e.g., blacks, Asians or Hispanics) more positively, the same, or more negatively than members of their own groups.
For our purposes here, we focus on the degree to which members of a given group rate members of the other groups more negatively than members of their own group. We shall highlight only the most salient findings (see Figure 2 ). A similar response is evident in Figure 3 ,B, which depicts the percent opposed to intermarriage. Again, the strongest opposition is to intermarriage involving blacks. Roughly one third of the white respondents (32.8%) and one-third of the Asian respondents (31.8%) oppose an interracial marriage with a black.
In 1994, a much larger sample of Los Angeles County survey respondents (4,025) were asked to rate the members of other ethnic minority groups, on a seven point scale, in terms of a broader set of traits than were included in the 1992 LACSS. The specific traits are as follows: 1) tend to be unintelligent to tend to be intelligent; 2) prefer to be self-supporting to prefer to live off welfare;
3) tend to be hard to get along with to tend to be easy to get along with; 4) tend to speak English well to tend to speak English poorly; 5) tend to be involved in gangs and drugs to tend not to be involved in gangs and drugs; and 6) tend to treat other groups equally to tend to discriminate against member of other groups. In addition to the ratings of non-Hispanic white, black and Hispanic survey respondents, these data provide insights into how members of three dis? tinct Asian groups -Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese -rate members of other ethnic groups. First, it has prompted a high degree of middle-class white and middle-class black flight from port of entry metropolitan areas (Frey, 1995a (Frey, , 1995b  Johnson and Roseman, 1990). As shown in (Frey, 1993) . What this means, of course, is that the 1980s was a period of increasing racial and spatial inequality in American society, with black poor and disadvantaged immigrants concentrated in the largest urban centers while middle-class and upper-class blacks and whites sought refuge in more hospitable and economically viable residential environments (Frey, 1993 (Frey, , 1995a (Frey, , 1995b (Fuchs, 1995; Brownstein, 1995) . Blacks see this move as being wrong (Brownstein, 1995 ers than there are available jobs (Freeman, 1991 vantaged blacks share the same residential neighborhoods, the fact that the former have been able to secure jobs and the latter have not has been a source of enormous tension and conflict Johnson and Farrell, 1993 (Grant and Johnson, 1995) .
As
At the upper end of the labor market, employer-induced tensions and con?
flicts also exist (Richards, 1995; Zachary, 1995) . Here they are generated by employers' use of the temporary work visa and employment-based provisions of the immigration law to bring in foreign workers for professional level jobs that might otherwise go to native-born Americans. This is thought to be a common practice in the United States among multinational corporations, universities, and computer and movie companies (Zachary, 1995 (Richards, 1995) .
To settle the case, the contractor was forced to pay $77,000 in back wages to the 40 foreign programmers, to hire 40 American programmers in the next year, and to spend $1 million to train U.S. workers in the latest software tech?
niques. The company also agreed not to bring any more foreign programmers into this country for 90 days (Zachary, 1995) .
Complaints about these kinds of practices have led a group of Austin, Texas programmers to form a political action committee to protect their jobs (Richards, 1995) . These and other concerned groups have encouraged mem? bers of Congress to press for cuts in the number of such workers allowed entry into the United States under this provision from 65,000 to 30,000 annually. Moreover, there is one bill before the U.S. Congress that is designed to discourage the practice by requiring foreigners to be paid 10 percent more than their American predecessor (Zachary, 1995) .
Linguistic-Induced Conflict
In U.S. communities where large numbers of immigrants have settled, lin? guistic diversity is now the order of the day (Keeler, 1995; Headden, 1995a Headden, , 1995b The nativist backlash is fueled by the perception that: 1) their culture and traditions are being imperiled; 2) their level of education is being lowered; 3) their jobs and housing are being taken; 4) their political influence is being lessened; 5) English is declining as the primary language; and 6) social and health services are being overburdened (^Salin, 1997 Second, it is imperative to recognize that, even if the federal government were to curtail foreign immigration today, the U.S. population will become far more racially and ethnically diverse over the next 20 years or so through nat? ural population increase alone. In other words, immigration-induced popula? tion diversity is here to stay. Thus, it is necessary to develop affirmative steps to ensure that the fruits of a diverse society will materialize in this country, especially in the current climate of economic instability, declining wages, and xenophobia.
This will require strategies to be implemented at different levels of society. 
